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TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL LAW 
Dr.  Elaine Fahey  




Transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs received its most prominent rule-making 
impetus after the September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, when a raft of EU-US Justice and Home 
Affairs Agreements were enacted.1 Rule-making from this particular period may be considered to 
deŵoŶstƌate the liŵitatioŶs of ŵutual ƌeĐogŶitioŶ of eaĐh otheƌ͛s legal oƌdeƌ oƌ the shoƌtĐoŵiŶgs of 
adequacy presumptions in law.2 Nonetheless, over a decade after 9/11, transatlantic cooperation in 
criminal law continues to have a lively agenda, even if the impetus for terrorism legislation in the 
transatlantic context has abated. EU-US Agreements in Justice and Home Affairs have inspired the 
EU to engage iŶ ͚ƌepliĐa͛ ƌule-making of policies, programmes and Agreements.3  For example, there 
have been various EU Security policies pursued which have clear imprints of EU-US policies. The EU 
has developed an EU Passenger Name Records Directive and an EU Terrorist Finance Tracking 
System, mirroring in form, context and lexicon the EU-US Passenger Name Records (EU-US PNR) 
Agreements and EU-US Terrorist Financial Tracking Programme (EU-US TFTP) Agreements.4 EU 
internal security rule-making grapples increasingly with the relationship between its external and 
internal dimensions.5 The EU͛s ƌule-making with the US receives special mention in such internal 
                                                              Senior Lecturer in Law, City Law School, City University London. Email: Elaine.fahey.1@city.ac.uk . 
1 Elaine FaheǇ, ͚Laǁ aŶd GoǀeƌŶaŶĐe as ĐheĐks aŶd ďalaŶĐes iŶ TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ “eĐuƌitǇ͛ (2013) YEL 32  1. See also 
on transatlantic rule-making Valsamis  Mitsilegas, ͚TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ CouŶteƌ-terrorism Cooperation and European 
Values: the Elusiǀe Quest foƌ CoheƌeŶĐe͛ aŶd Juan “aŶtos Vaƌa, ͚TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ CouŶteƌ-terrorism Agreements 
oŶ the tƌaŶsfeƌ of peƌsoŶal data: a test foƌ deŵoĐƌatiĐ aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ iŶ the EU͛ in Elaine Fahey and Deirdre 
Curtin (eds), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US 
legal orders (Cambridge University Press 2014) Chs. 14 & 15 therein. See Valsamis Mitsilegas, ͚EU-US Co-
operation in Criminal Matters post-9/11: Extradition, Mutual Legal AssistaŶĐe aŶd the EǆĐhaŶge of PoliĐe Data͛ 
(2003) 8 E.F.A.Rev. 515; Valsamis Mitsilegas ͚The EǆteƌŶal DiŵeŶsioŶ of EU AĐtioŶ iŶ CƌiŵiŶal Matteƌs͛ (2007) 
12 E.F.A.Rev. 471; Kristin AƌĐhiĐk, ͚EU-U“ CoopeƌatioŶ AgaiŶst Teƌƌoƌisŵ͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ Congressional Research 
Service 7-5700; Marise CƌeŵoŶa, ͚JustiĐe aŶd Hoŵe Affaiƌs iŶ a Gloďalised Woƌld: AŵďitioŶs aŶd ‘ealitǇ iŶ the 
tale of the EU-U“ “WIFT AgƌeeŵeŶt͛ (2011) Working Paper No. 4  Institute for European integration Research 
Marieke de Goede, ͚The “WIFT affaiƌ aŶd the Gloďal PolitiĐs of EuƌopeaŶ “eĐuƌitǇ͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ϱϬ J.Com.Mar.St 214; 
Elaine FaheǇ, ͚OŶ the Use of Laǁ iŶ TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ ‘elatioŶs: Legal Dialogues ďetǁeeŶ the EU aŶd U“͛ ELJ 
(forthcoming); Patryk Pawlak, (ed), The EU-US security and justice agenda in action (EUISS Chaillot Paper 
2012); Theodore Geoƌgopoulos ͚What kiŶd of TƌeatǇ-Making Power for the EU? Constitutional problems 
related to the conclusion of the EU-U“ AgƌeeŵeŶts oŶ EǆtƌaditioŶ aŶd Mutual legal AssistaŶĐe͛ ;ϮϬϬϱͿ ϯϬ 
E.L.Rev. 191; William Gilmore,͚The EǆteƌŶal DiŵeŶsioŶ of EU AĐtioŶ iŶ CƌiŵiŶal Matteƌs͛  in Maria Fletcher, 
Robin Loof  and William Gilmore (eds), EU Criminal Law and Justice 150. 
2See Mitsilegas; Santos Vara, (n 1) . 
3 For example, Proposal For a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, 
detection investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime COM(2011)32, Commission 
Communication, A European terrorist finance tracking system available options COM(2011)429 final. See 
Elaine Fahey, ͚Legal Issues of Transatlantic Rule-Transfer onto EU Internal Security Law: The Development of an 
EU PasseŶgeƌ Naŵe ‘eĐoƌds aŶd EU Teƌƌoƌist FiŶaŶĐial TƌaĐkiŶg “Ǉsteŵ͛ (forthcoming) EJIS. 
4   See Section 1, next. 
5 See Elaine Fahey,  ͚The EU͛“ CǇďeƌĐƌiŵe aŶd CǇďeƌ “eĐuƌitǇ ‘ule-Making: Mapping the Internal and External 
Dimensions of EU Security͛ (forthcoming) EJRR; Florian Trauner and  Helena Carrapico, ͚The external dimension 
of EU justice and home affairs after the Lisbon Treaty: analysing the dynamics of eǆpaŶsioŶ aŶd diǀeƌsifiĐatioŶ͛ 
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rule-making processes, for example, in cybercrime and cyber security.6 The recent NSA surveillance 
saga has placed EU-US Justice and Home Affairs cooperation centre stage once more.7 More 
specifically, the outbreak of the NSA surveillance saga in the midst of the rule-making processes has 
operated to place EU citizens fundamental rights and data protection centrally in all rule-making of 
the EU with the US, from trade to security. It caused the European Parliament to vote to suspend all 
EU-US data transfer agreements.8 By contrast, the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial 
meeting in late 2013 stressed the importance of developing the EU-US negotiations on a data 
protection agreement, referencing the work of the EU-US ad hoc working group on the NSA 
surveillance saga.9  
Current EU-US cooperation in counterterrorism and security includes diverse and particular areas 
such as inter alia EU-US Cybercrime and Security, Counter Violent Extremism (͚CVE͛) cooperation, 
foreign fighteƌ͛s cooperation and explosives security.10 Future areas of EU-US criminal law 
cooperation envisaged includes inter alia ǀiĐtiŵs͛ rights and hate crimes. They explicitly take 
cognisance of EU legislative developments, as well as the process of reform of EU agencies 
underfoot (e.g. as to Europol, Eurojust etc).11 This demonstrates the vibrancy of the cooperation and 
its evolving character, as well as the challenging relationship between the ͚eǆteƌŶal͛ aŶd ͚iŶteƌŶal͛ for 
the EU. 
The chapter purports to offer a ͚birds-eye͛ view of key contemporary instruments and mechanisms 
in the area of Transatlantic Cooperation in Criminal Law. It begins with a brief overview of 
understanding contemporary Transatlantic Cooperation through Law (Section 1) and then moves to 
outline key agreements between the EU and US in Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance, including 
Death penalty cooperation (Section 2). Thereafter, there is a brief consideration of Agreements 
between Europol and the US (Section 3), and then the chapter reflects upon the latest area of 
transatlantic cooperation in Criminal law, namely EU Cybercrime and Cyber Security (Section 4), 
followed by concluding reflections. On grounds of space and definitional exclusion of predominantly 
civil law mechanisms, agreements between the EU and US to transfer data for purposes pursuant to 
security cooperation are not considered here.12  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(2012)  17 E.F.A.Rev. 5; FloƌiaŶ TƌauŶeƌ,  ͚The internal-external security nexus: more coherence under 
LisďoŶ?͛ (EUISS Occasional Paper No 89, March 2011) 
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op89_The_internal-external_security_nexus.pdf.> aĐĐessed… 
6  See section 4.  
7 “ee ͚EU-U“ CouŶteƌteƌƌoƌisŵ paĐts at ƌisk oǀeƌ sŶoopiŶg affaiƌ͛ EUObserver.com (5 July 2013); ͚MEPs ƌaise 
suspension of EU-U“ ďaŶk data deal͛ LIBE Press release (24 September 2013)  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130923IPR20604/html/MEPs-raise-
suspension-of-EU-US-bank-data-deal> accessed 31 March 2014.  
8 European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2013 on the suspension of the TFTP agreement as a result of 
US National Security Agency surveillance (2013/2831(RSP)) 
9 EU-US Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting of 18 November 2013, Council 16418/13, 18 November, 
2013; ͚‘epoƌt oŶ the FiŶdiŶgs ďǇ the EU Co-chairs of the Ad Hoc EU-US Working Group on Data ProtectioŶ͛, 
Council doc 16987/13, 27 November, 2013 ; ͚‘eďuildiŶg Tƌust iŶ EU-U“ Data Floǁs͛ COM;ϮϬϭϯͿ ϴϰϲ fiŶal. 
10 Summary of Conclusions of the EU-US JHA Ministerial Meeting (18 November 2013) Council doc. 16682/13. 
See also the European External Action Service overview of transatlantic cooperation in justice and home 
affairs: <http://eeas.europa.eu/us/sector_en.htm> accessed 31 March 2014.   
11 Ministerial JHA meeting (n 9)  
12 Although the definitional line is difficult to maintain. It is covered extensively elsewhere: see  (n 1) .Also not 




1. Transatlantic cooperation through law 
The recent negotiations between the EU and US on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) may signify a new era of legal cooperation between the EU and US in trade, if 
successful because of their plan for the institutionalisation of transatlantic trade relations.13 The 
institutionalisation of EU-US security cooperation has also been recently mooted as a next step 
forward in transatlantic cooperation.14 Nevertheless, the relationship between the EU and US is 
conventionally ǀieǁed as a ͚laǁ-light͛ aŶd ͚iŶstitutioŶallǇ-light͛ sĐieŶtifiĐ eŶtitǇ.15 Relations between 
the EU and US have been guided by documents such as the Transatlantic Declaration and the New 
Transatlantic Agenda, which are not legally binding.16 Historically, most rule-making between the EU 
and US has taken place in permanent networks of dialogues- but notably not in justice.17 They have 
variable degrees of success or failure and comprise public and private spheres, variable actors and 
activities.18 In this regard, the democratic credentials of transatlantic rule-making are not per se 
rated highly. For example, these dialogues are perceived to have given certain economic actors 
privileged access to policy makers at the expense of other sectors of transatlantic society.19 
However, as the TTIP negotiations signify, rule-making networks between the EU and US, such as the 
formal and permanent dialogues between the EU and US, along with High Level Working Groups, are 
subject to increasing standards and expectations of participation and transparency.  
Rule-making in Justice and Home Affairs in the post 9/11 period has similarly been subject to broad 
critique for the secrecy surrounding its negotiation and the scant attention to questions of 
fundamental rights in much of the rule-making.20 Two of the most prominent Agreements entered 
into by the EU with US in the post 9/11 period, designed to communicate air passenger data and to 
target the financing of terrorism are the EU-US Passenger Name Records (EU-US PNR) Agreements 
and EU-US Terrorist Financial Tracking Programme (EU-US TFTP) Agreements.21 These Agreements, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
MEP “ophie iŶ͛ t ǀeld iŶ ƌespeĐt of EU-US Agreements on data transfer for security/ counter-terrorism 
purposes: See IŶ͛t veld v. DepartŵeŶt of HoŵelaŶd Security (2008 No. 1151, US District of Columbia District 
Judge Collyer) (15 December 2008); See T-529/09 IŶ͛t Veld v. CouŶcil, Judgment of the General Court of 4 May 
2012 [2012] ECR II-000 (under appeal: Case C-350/12, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 12 February 
2014). They possibly indicate the increasingly justiciable character of transatlantic security 
13 See Marija Bartl and Elaine FaheǇ, ͚A PostŶatioŶal MaƌketplaĐe? OŶ the NegotiatioŶ of the TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ 
Tƌade aŶd IŶǀestŵeŶt PaƌtŶeƌship ;TTIPͿ͛ iŶ FaheǇ aŶd CuƌtiŶ, (n 1)  
14  See discussion of Handbook in Section 2.  
15 Mark PollaĐk, ͚The Neǁ TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ AgeŶda at TeŶ: ‘efleĐtions in an experiment in International 
GoǀeƌŶaŶĐe͛ (2005) 43 J.Com.Mar.St., ϴϵϵ. Cf  FaheǇ, ͚On the use of Law in Transatlantic Relations: Legal 
Dialogues BetǁeeŶ the EU aŶd U“͛ (n 1)  
16 The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), ssigned 3 December, 1995 in Madrid. 
17 Eg, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Transatlantic Labour Dialogue, Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue and 
Transatlantic Environment Dialogue 
18 See Maria Green Cowles, ͚The Transatlantic Business Dialogue: Transforming the New Transatlantic 
Dialogue͛ in Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer (eds), Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (Lanham 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2001) 215  
19 Ibid 
20 See Mitsilegas  n 1.  
21 See Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
Passenger Name Record Data to the United States Department of Homeland Security of 17 November 2011; 
COM (2011) 807 final, approved by the European Parliament in April 2012 (hereafter EU-US PNR); Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and Transfer of Financial 
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even in later evolutions, have generated much controversy on account of their limitations on redress 
and their uneven application of US law to EU citizens, not enabling the latter to fully realise their 
rights to redress and review. The formulation of the character of rights, remedies and redress is 
distinctively replicated in both agreements in a broad time frame, extending well after a decade post 
9/11.22 As a result, they are perceived to form very prominent examples of the limits of mutual 
recognition of justice in transatlantic relations.23 Moreover, the use of detailed governance or review 
mechanisms to monitor the operation of these agreements has generated little by way of 
substantive change.24 It forms a complexity that is nonetheless essential to understanding the nature 
of and limits of transatlantic cooperation. However, as is explored later below, there are new fields 
of cooperation ongoing and even mooted institutionalisation of security that tends to suggest a new 
era of law in transatlantic relations.  
This chapter considers next the key features of transatlantic cooperation mechanisms in criminal law 
in two prominent subject areas of cooperation, Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance.  
2. The EU-US Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements 
Overview 
In June 2003, the EU and US signed two treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance so as to 
simplify the extradition process and promote better prosecutorial cooperation, as part of efforts to 
improve transatlantic security cooperation post 9/11.25 The Agreements were historic as they were 
the first law enforcement agreements conducted between the EU and US and the first cooperation 
agreements to be negotiated by the Council in criminal matters pursuant to ex Articles 24 and 38 
Treaty of the European Union (TEU).26 The negotiation of bilateral instruments with 15 EU Member 
States followed thereafter as well as the negotiation with 10 new accession States in 2004.  After the 
2007, two full extradition treaties and two bilateral mutual assistance instruments were concluded 
with Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.  An exchange of instruments between the EU and US took place 
in 2009 and all instruments and the Agreements entered into force on 1 February 2010, prompting 
many to note the time lag between the beginning of the rule-making process and its output, albeit 
that it appears readily explicable on the basis of the Enlargement process which took effect just at 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Messaging data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program (hereafter TFTP), OJ L 195  
22 On reciprocity and its limits see Gregory “haffeƌ, ͚Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Roles: The Prospects and 
Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor 
AgƌeeŵeŶts͛ (2002) 9  Colum.J.Eur.L. 29; Valsamis Mitsilegas, ͚CoŶstitutioŶal IŵpliĐatioŶs of Mutual 
‘eĐogŶitioŶ iŶ CƌiŵiŶal Matteƌs iŶ the EU͛ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ ϰϯ CML Rev. 1277   
23 FaheǇ, ͚Law and Governance as Checks and Balances in Transatlantic Security: Rights, Redress and Remedies 
in EU-US Passenger Name Records and the Terƌoƌist FiŶaŶĐe TƌaĐkiŶg Pƌogƌaŵ͛ (n 1)  
24 Ibid 
25 See Council Decision 2009/820/CFSP of 23 October 2009 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union 
of the Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of America and the 
Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of America, [2003] 
OJ 181/25. On the concluded treaties, see [2009] OJ L 291/40 and the Extradition Treaty to the Dutch Antilles: 
[2009] OJ L 325/4 
26 See Mitsilegas 2003; Mitsilegas 2009; Georgopolous in n 1. See also Steve Peers, Justice and Home Affairs 
Law (OUP 2011) 751 . 
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the time that the US Senate was ready to consider the Agreements and all bilateral instruments with 
the Member States.27  
Their negotiation surpassed the debate on whether the EU had legal personality at this time to so 
act. As a result, many suggested that appeared as a step towards the EU being a global player in the 
area of criminal law or at least a precedent of the EU speaking with one voice in criminal matters, 
globally.28 The secrecy of the negotiation of the agreements and their limited review by parliaments 
in both jurisdictions gave rise to concerns about the democratic character of the agreements.29 
Similarly, the omission of human rights protections from the scope of the agreements provoked 
concerns, as did the prospect of joint investigation teams working together as well as the place of 
personal data within the scope of the agreements.30 These concerns are ones which are common to 
all post 9/11 rule-making in this field. 
A frequent question arises as to the added value of EU-US Agreements beyond what were previously 
existing bilaterally between the US and individual Member States. The EU-US Agreements in Article 
3(2) refer to the US and each Member State entering into a written instrument to acknowledge their 
effect on existing bilateral extradition treaties and/ or MLATs. Most Member States have chosen the 
teƌŵ ͚iŶstƌuŵeŶt͛, ďut Ŷot all.31 There are also some variations in the form of the bilateral 
instruments across the Member States. A majority of Member States opted for an instrument 
containing an annex clearly stating the changes made by the EU-US Agreements, but there are 
considerable variations in a minority of States. The EU remains responsible for the implementation 
of each Agreement.32 The Member States are bound to the provisions of each EU-US Agreement as a 
matter of law and also have separate but parallel international obligations with the US under the 
bilateral instruments.33 It was asserted to possibly give rise to considerable implementation issues, 
some comparing it to the implementation to that of the European arrest warrant, which has been 
frequently been subject to challenges in the Member States,34  although practice suggests that this 
viewpoint has not come to fruition.  
At the time of writing, there were 54 agreements in place between the EU and US on extradition and 
mutual legal assistance.35 This cooperation remains furthered by cooperation amongst practitioners 
through the auspices of Eurojust, cooperation which won significant joint praise for its effectiveness 
                                                             
27 The US had extradition treaties with all EU Member States and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements with 20 
of 27 by 2011, demonstrating the swiftness of the rule-making.   
28 Mitsilegas  2003 (n 1) 533, referring to Nanette Neuwahl, ͚A PaƌtŶeƌ ǁith a tƌouďled personality: EU Treaty 
ŵakiŶg iŶ ŵatteƌs of CF“P aŶd JHA afteƌ Aŵsteƌdaŵ͛ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ ϯ E.F.A.Rev. 177; Ramses Wessel, ͚The IŶside 
lookiŶg out: CoŶsisteŶĐǇ aŶd DeliŵitatioŶ iŶ EU EǆteƌŶal ‘elatioŶs͛ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ϯϳ  CML Rev.  1135. See also JÖRG 
MoŶaƌ ͚The EU as aŶ IŶteƌŶatioŶal AĐtoƌ iŶ the doŵaiŶ of JustiĐe aŶd Hoŵe Affaiƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ϵ  E.F.A.Rev. 
406 
29 Mitsilegas, n 1  ;  See Valsamis Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009). 
30 Steve Peers, Justice and Home Affairs Law (OUP 2011) 751 
31 Handbook on the practical application of the EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Agreements 
Council doc. 8024/11 (25 March 2011), which is an official non-binding document, drafted by the EU 
Presidency and the US Delegation in 2011.    
32 Ibid.    
33 Ibid, 7.  
34 Christian KauŶeƌt, ͚The EǆteƌŶal DiŵeŶsioŶ of EU CouŶteƌ-terrorism Relations: Competences, Interests and 
IŶstitutioŶs͛ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ ϮϮ Terrorism & Political Violence 41, 56. 
35 Summary of Conclusions of the EU-US JHA Ministerial Meeting (18 November 2013) Council doc. 16682/13. 
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(by both and EU and US) in recent times.36 The 2011 Official Handbook on the application of the 
Agreements emphasises the existence of established practice and the evolving nature of EU-US rule-
making.37 Article 21 of the EU-US Extradition Agreement and Article 17 of the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Agreement stipulate that the Contracting parties will review their application no later 
than 5 years after their entry into force. In this review process, notably practical arrangements are to 
be considered as well as the evolving nature of the EU itself. The EU has expressed its eagerness to 
review the agreements in late 2013. Notably, the non-binding official Handbook on the agreements 
expresses the agreements to form possibly the basis of an institutional relationship between the EU 
and US on security. This demonstrates the far-reaching ambitious of transatlantic security 
cooperation. The Agreements themselves (Article 18 Extradition Agreement; Article 14 MLA 
Agreement) expressly permit the negotiation of new bilateral treaties which are consistent with the 
respective EU-US Agreements.  
The account next sets out key provisions of the EU-US Extradition Agreements, followed by an 
outline of the place of the death penalty within the EU-US Extradition Agreement. 
Overview of the EU-US Extradition Agreement 
The EU-US Extradition Agreement was the centrepiece of the first-EU-US Summit held since the Iraqi 
war, in the aftermath of failed US attempts to extradite an accused flight instructor of the 9/11 
hijackers on the grounds of proof of the US claim. The Extradition Agreement is viewed as having 
significantly widened the list of extradition offences (in Article 4 thereof)38 and introduced provisions 
inter alia simplifying the transmission of documents (Article 7), furnishing additional information 
(Article 8), the temporary surrender of persons already in custody (Article 9), competing requests for 
extradition (Article 10), simplifying procedures where the fugitive consented to extradition (Article 
11), the treatment of sensitive information (Article 14), the transit of fugitives and the exclusion of 
death penalty fugitives (Article 13). As outlined above, Article 3(2) of the Agreement provides that 
each Member State must acknowledge the Agreement in their bilateral agreement with the US. This 
resulted in various Member States altering their agreements. The reasons are far from cosmetic, 
because of, for example, the role provided for Interpol in the EU-US Agreement on provisional arrest 
in Article 6. The definition of an extraditable offence in Article 4 is credited with modernising the 
definition thereof by applying a dual criminality analysis. Where there is already a dual-criminality 
approach in the existing bilateral extradition treaty with a Member State, the EU-U“ AgƌeeŵeŶt͛s 
provisions do not apply, given that it is perceived as preferable to continue to apply existing and 
well-functioning provisions.39   
The specific place of the death penalty in EU-US Extradition law is next considered.  
EU-US Death Penalty Cooperation and Extradition 
                                                             
36 Ibid.  
37 See Handbook (n 31) .  
38 See Peers (n 30).  
39 See Handbook (n 31).  
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There is a long-standing opposition by the EU to capital punishment40 and all EU Member States are 
party to the ECHR Protocol 13 on the abolition of the death penalty. Moreover, Article 2 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits the death penalty in any circumstances. During the 
negotiation of the EU-US Extradition and Mutual Assistance Agreements, the death penalty proved a 
specific challenge for negotiations so as to accommodate the EU prohibition on the death within its 
legal mores. The US had sought a clause in the Extradition agreement guaranteeing the extradition 
of any EU national. As a result, the Agreement contains a clause permitting the requested State to 
make non-application of the death penalty a condition of extradition in Article 13.41 An evaluation of 
existing practice in 2011 by the EU and US in their joint Handbook indicates that the language in 
Article 13 precisely reflects practice, which is that the US as a general rule agrees to the condition 
that the death penalty is not imposed, although one must discern conditionality to such an 
assessment. 
 
Notably, the EU has made many amicus curiae advocacy submissions before the US Supreme Court 
in death penalty cases, even those with no application to the EU.42  This is ͚tƌaĐeaďle͛ peƌhaps to the 
faĐt that the EU delegatioŶ iŶ WashiŶgtoŶ DC has a speĐifiĐ offiĐial Đhaƌged ǁith fuƌtheƌiŶg the EU͛s 
campaign against the death penalty for over a decade at the time of writing- thus preceding and 
postdating the Treaty of Lisbon with its innovations in legal personality and fundamental rights43 and 
they have been centrally involved in this advocacy. This advocacy has been somewhat successful- i.e. 
within US Supreme Court jurisprudence:– and  shows the reach of specific action beyond formal 
transatlantic cooperation through law.44  
 
The chapter next considers the provisions of the EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement. 
EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement 
Overview 
The EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Agreement has its origins in several provisions in the EU 
Mutual Assistance Convention of 2000 and its Protocol of 2001.45 The MLA Agreement is designed as 
an assistance mechanism between law enforcement authorities and does not confer rights on 
                                                             
40 ͚EU DeŵaƌĐhes oŶ the issue of the death peŶaltǇ- DeĐlaƌatioŶ͛,  iŶ CoŶĐlusioŶs of the GeŶeƌal Affaiƌs  
Council, 29 June 1998; EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, Council doc. 10015/08, 5 June 2008 ; now Article 
19(2) Charter of Fundamental Rights. See also Marise Cremona, ͚Values in EU Foreign Policy͛ in Malcom Evans 
and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the Established Legal Orders Policy interconnections between the EU and 
the rest of the world (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011) 275.  
41 Agreement on Extradition between the United States and EU [2003] OJ L 181/27, Article 13.  
42 See McCarver v. North Carolina  533 US 975 (2001); Atkins v. Virginia 536 US 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons 
534 US 551 (2005); Medellin v. State of Texas 552 US 491 (2008). See the account given Cremona n 40. See 
Fahey, ͚On The Use Of Law in Transatlantic Relations: Legal Dialogues Between the EU and US͛ (n 1).  
43 Notes of interviews on file with the author. 
44 Atkins v. Virginia 536 US 304 (2002). Justice Stevens speaks of the ǀieǁs of the ͚ǁoƌld ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛ iŶ 
condemning the execution of the mentally retarded:  at 317, n. 21. However, see Medellin v. State of Texas 
552 US 491 (2008), where the EU unsuccessfully made submissions in proceedings concerning the 
constitutional impropriety of an Executive Order instructing State courts to implement a judgment of the 
International Court of Justice.  On the perceived impact of differences in approach to extradition as a result, 
see V NaŶda ͚Bases foƌ ƌefusiŶg IŶteƌŶatioŶal eǆtƌaditioŶ ƌeƋuests- Capital puŶishŵeŶt aŶd Toƌtuƌe͛ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ϲϯ 
Fordham Int'l L.J.  Journal 1369 
45 See Eileen DeŶza ͚The ϮϬϬϬ CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ Mutual AssistaŶĐe iŶ CƌiŵiŶal Matteƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ϰϬ CML Rev. 1073.   
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private parties e.g. defendants, because of the perceived inability of authorities to cope with the 
volume of possible requests across the Atlantic, but also the predominantly adversarial system of 
justice in the US. The MLA Agreement created what the 2011 Handbook refers to as a ͚treaty-based, 
alďeit paƌtial͛ mutual legal assistance relationship between the US and 7 Member States (Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Finland, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia).  
The EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement amended bilateral treaties where it existed as 
regards the supply of banking information (Article 4), joint investigative teams (Article 5), video 
conferencing of witnesses/ experts (Article 6), expedited transmission of requests (Article 7), the 
extension of mutual assistance rules to administrative authorities (Article 8), the protection of 
personal data (Article 9) and request confidentiality provisions (Article 19). Article 4 in particular was 
significant for placing the parties under an obligation to search for the existence of bank accounts 
and financial transactions unrelated to specific bank accounts and also including provisions on 
banking secrecy. Member States have designated their central authorities to process these requests, 
whilst the US has designated three federal law enforcement agencies (FBI, DEA and ICE)46 to process 
the requests. It was significant for including within its scope evidence sharing for criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, streamlining of extradition arrangements, central points of contact 
between US and EU judicial authorities and the sharing of sensitive data, such as related to bank 
accounts and terrorist financing. While it was endorsed, for example, by the European Parliament 
Civil Liberties Committee in 2003, it was simultaneously criticised its provisions on fundamental 
rights grounds.47 Nonetheless it receives considerably less attention from such quarters in recent 
times, where the spotlight lies upon data transfer agreements. 
 The chapter next outlines key features of the high profile agency-level cooperation between the EU 
and US, pursuant to the EU-US Europol Agreements.  
 
3. EU-US Europol Agreements 
Overview 
Europol was established by an International Convention in 1995 and became an EU Agency in 2009. 
Its further reform is envisaged in Article 88 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
and at the time of writing a draft Regulation on its reform is under consideration.48 It has been 
accorded powers of international cooperation furthered through legal personality and it plays a 
distinctive role in various transatlantic security agreements with third countries, a broader 
discussion of which is not entered into here.49 A Draft Regulation published in 2013 envisages similar 
                                                             
46 Eg  Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency and Immigration and Customs Enforcement  
47 See the account in Mitsilegas, 2003 (n 1)  . 
48See Draft Regulation on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training  
(Europol) and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA, COM(2013) 173 final. See also Christian 
KauŶeƌt ͚ Euƌopol aŶd EU CouŶteƌteƌƌoƌisŵ: IŶteƌŶatioŶal “eĐuƌitǇ AĐtoƌŶess iŶ the EǆteƌŶal DiŵeŶsioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ 
33 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 652; ͚EuƌopeaŶ and FBI discuss cooperation countering international 
orgnaised crime and teƌƌoƌisŵ͛ (31 January 2014), see <https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_news/europol-
and-fbi-discuss-cooperation-countering-international-organised-crime-and-terrorism>. On its role in the EU-US 
TFTP Agreement, see Fahey, ͚Laǁ aŶd GoǀeƌŶaŶĐe as ĐheĐks aŶd ďalaŶĐes iŶ TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ “eĐuƌitǇ͛ (n 1).  
49 See Nikolaos LaǀƌaŶos ͚Euƌopol aŶd the Fight AgaiŶst Teƌƌoƌisŵ͛ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ϴ E.F.A.Rev. 269 
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powers to establish and maintain international cooperation agreements.50 In 2001 and 2002, two 
US-Europol agreements were concluded, with some urgency despite their effects upon personal 
data, so as to allow US law enforcement authorities and Europol to share both strategic and personal 
information including criminal records.51 The first agreement concerned the exchange of strategic 
aŶd teĐhŶiĐal foƌŵatioŶ as to oǀeƌall ͚seƌious foƌŵs of iŶteƌŶatioŶal Đƌiŵe͛. It iŶĐluded ǁithiŶ its 
ƌeŵit ͚Đƌiŵes Đoŵŵitted oƌ likelǇ to ďe Đoŵŵitted iŶ the Đouƌse of ĐƌiŵiŶal aĐtiǀities͛, puƌsuaŶt to 
Article 3 thereof. The Agreement identified points of contact, information exchange, mutual 
consultation, exchange of expertise and the exchange of liaison officers. The second agreement, the 
supplemental agreement on the exchange of personal data and related information, took longer to 
negotiate on the basis of civil liberties concerns. It is noted for including a significant number of data 
protection safeguards not previouslǇ ĐoŶĐeded ďǇ the U“, iŶĐludiŶg foƌ eǆaŵple, ͚puƌpose 
liŵitatioŶ͛, ǁhiĐh ďouŶd U“ fedeƌal ageŶĐies pƌoǀided ǁith iŶfoƌŵatioŶ uŶdeƌ the AgƌeeŵeŶt iŶ 
section 7 thereof.  
These agreements raised concerns as to their broad scope of information exchange, even beyond 
the remit of Europol at the time, for example, by not specifying the nature of the offences referred 
to in Article 5 of the Agreement.52 It further raised issues as to the use of the data by US local 
authorities, giving them great access than in the EU. Similarly, provisions as to the onwards 
transmission of data to third States without adequate delimitation raised critique, as did the vaguely 
worded nature of oversight of the implementation of the Agreement.53 Article 9 thereof also 
contained a series of data protection safeguards, albeit that their adequacy was similarly questioned 
from the outset. Later in 2002, a Council Decision stipulated that each Member State had to 
communicate a range of intelligence information to Europol, including data identifying groups, acts 
under investigation and links with other relevant terrorist offences. As noted above, at the time of 
writing, significant revisions to Europol are ongoing in the legislative process, which reflect 
significant develops as regards its accountability and legitimacy. It forms part of a broader reform 
process for agencies in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. These developments remain 
actively under consideration in contemporary EU-US relations.54  
Newer forms of bilateral cooperation arising from new administrations both in the EU and US offer 
an alternative perspective on Justice and Home Affairs in transatlantic relations. They offer a specific 
                                                             
50 See Article 64 of the Draft Regulation (legal personality); Maintenance and establishment of international 
cooperation (including with third countries, as defined therein) (Article 29); transmission of data thereto 
(Article 31). 
51 See the account of Mitsilegas, (n 1) 518. For the Agreements, which have enjoyed a veritably ͚elusive͛ legal 
text which lacks an Official Journal reference, see 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/flags/united_states_of_america.pdf> accessed 31 March 
2014 and 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/flags/supplemental_agreement_between_europol_and_th
e_usa_on_exchange_of_personal_data_and_related_information.pdf> accessed 31 March 2014. See its listing 
of its international / external cooperation agreements on its website: 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/external-cooperation-31> accessed 31 March 2014. 
52 Ibid.  
53 See Lavranos (n 50) . 
54 I.e. envisaged in the Ministerial meeting (n 9). See also Madalina Busuioc, European Agencies: Law and 
Practices of Accountability (OUP 2013) and Madalina Busuioc, Deirdre Curtin and Martijn GƌoeŶleeƌ, ͚Agency 
growth between autonomy and accountability: the EuƌopeaŶ PoliĐe OffiĐe as a ͚liǀiŶg iŶstitutioŶ͛ (2011) 
18 J.E.P.P.  848 
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perspective on the nature and boundaries of bilateral cooperation. The chapter next considers 
ongoing developments in EU-US cybercrime and cybersecurity.  
 
4. EU-US Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Cooperation 
The latest transatlantic cooperation in JHA is in cybercrime and cybersecurity, in the form of the EU-
US Working Group on Cybercrime and Cybersecurity group (WGCC), was established after the EU-US 
Summit in November 2010. 55  However, the origins of this cooperation date back a decade earlier to 
the Joint EC-US Task Force on Critical Infrastructure Protection.56 Also around this time, the Council 
of Europe Cybercrime Convention was adopted, which now forms a central legal element of EU-US 
cooperation as well as internal EU rule-making in this field.57 The EU-US cooperation goals are 
predominantly in four areas: the expansion of cyber incident management response capabilities 
jointly and globally, through a cooperation programme culminating in a joint-EU-US cyber-incident 
exercise by the end of 2011, to broadly engage the private sector using public-private partnerships, 
sharing good practices with industry and to launch a programme of joint awareness raising activities, 
to remove child pornography from the internet and to advance the international ratification of the 
Council of Europe Convention by the EU and Council of Europe Member States and to encourage 
non-European countries to become parties.   
It seeŵs appaƌeŶt that the WGCC had fiƌst aŶd foƌeŵost ͚gloďal͛ ƌule-making objectives. The WGCC 
Gƌoup ŵeŶtioŶs speĐifiĐ ĐouŶtƌies to ďe ͚eŶĐouƌaged͛ to ďeĐoŵe paƌties to the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ, 
countries within and outside the EU.58 In late 2013, the US expressed its regrets in an EU-US JHA 
Ministerial meeting that five EU Member States still had not yet ratified the Convention. They 
further expressed regret that training had been subsidised by the EU to promote an alternative EU 
Convention.59 In 2008, the European Commission suggested that the redrafting of the Convention 
had become unachievable and nonetheless promoted both international and EU ratification, as it 
now does with the US.60 Another goal of the EU-US cooperation includes the endorsement of EU-US 
͚deliǀeƌaďles͛ iŶ ĐǇďeƌĐƌiŵe ďǇ the IŶteƌŶet CoƌpoƌatioŶ foƌ Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANNs).61 AŶd fuƌtheƌ eǀideŶĐe of the Ŷatuƌe of the ͚gloďal͛ oďjeĐtiǀes of the ƌule-making and 
                                                             
55 Council of the European Union, EU-US Summit, Joint Statement 16726/10 Presse 315, 20 November 2010, p. 
3; Presidency Conclusions of the Cybercrime Conference, Budapest Conclusions (13 April 2011); WGCC 
Concept Paper, Annex 1 . See Elaine FaheǇ ͚The EU͛“ CǇďeƌĐƌiŵe aŶd CǇďeƌ “eĐuƌitǇ ‘ule-Making: Mapping the 
IŶteƌŶal aŶd EǆteƌŶal DiŵeŶsioŶs of EU “eĐuƌitǇ͛ (2014) EJRR.  
56 ͚CƌeatiŶg a safeƌ IŶfoƌŵatioŶ “oĐietǇ ďǇ iŵpƌoǀiŶg the seĐuƌitǇ of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌes aŶd ĐoŵďatiŶg 
Đoŵputeƌ ƌelated Đƌiŵe͛: COM;ϮϬϬϬͿϴϵϬ fiŶal 
57 See Cyber-security Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace JOIN(2013)1final, 
Brussels, (7 February 2013). In the same period as the publication of the EU cyber-security strategy, the US 
President signed Executive orders providing for rules on cyber-security for the US, couched in a dense 
framework of administrative law which accords considerable discretion to officials of the Department of 
Homeland Security, contrasting significantly with EU rules emerging: Executive Order 13636,  Improving Critical 
Infrastructure cyber-security, Federal Register 78, No. 33 (19 February 2013). See also The 2013 Cyber-security 
Executive Order: Overview and Considerations for Change, Congressional Research Service 7-5700 R42984 (1 
March 2013). 
58 WGCC Concept Paper,  4 . 
59 Summary of Conclusions of the EU-US JHA Ministerial Meeting (18 November 2013) Council doc. 16682/13. 
60 COM(2010) 517 final, 2 
61 WGCC Concept paper, 3.  
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policy development is provided by the minutes of a 2011 meeting of EU-US Senior JHA Officials, 
where it was stated that the EU and US would work together in the UN to avoid dilution of the body 
of international law on cybercrime.62 
This latest EU-US cooperation may be said to indicate new boundaries in the transatlantic 
relationship on account of their global rule-making ambitions, notwithstanding firstly, formal 
limitations on the conduct of the US as an actor outside of the Council of Europe and secondly, the 
continued unwillingness of certain EU Member States to cooperate in the bilateral rule-making 
despite the urgency of cyber regulation.63 Unlike earlier bilateral rule-making, this newer rule-
making appears to have joint-shaƌed ͚gloďal͛ oďjeĐtiǀes. The goals of the WGCC suggest that they will 
lead eventually to the adoption of a global-like cyber policy or at the very least, global standard-
setting, through their promotion of the primacy of external norms. Instead, this newer bilateral rule-
making is distinctive because it does not seek to engage in mutual recognition in justice and home 
affaiƌs ďut ƌatheƌ has ͚laƌgeƌ͛ gloďal-like legal goals.  
 
Conclusion 
Transatlantic cooperation in criminal law is the subject of a vibrant agenda. It is one that currently 
appears heavily influenced by internal developments within the EU itself. The effects of the NSA 
affair appear not yet apparent and instead transatlantic rule-making continues to operate within its 
own autonomous political dynamic. An examination of contemporary practice reveals 
much͚sophistiĐatioŶ͛ iŶ the eǀolutioŶ of tƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ ĐƌiŵiŶal laǁ ĐoopeƌatioŶ. It appeaƌs perhaps 
even disproportionately extensive, relative to the many limitations of mutual recognition in justice. 
This chapter has described the evolution and status quo of many cooperation mechanisms in a 
variety of areas of justice and home affairs. They contrast with new mechanisms for cooperation 
with increasingly global rule-making goals. Nonetheless, concerns as to fundamental rights and data 
protection remain constants, at least from an EU perspective.  
The development of Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in practice in particular suggests a high 
level of cooperation and settled practice. This appears to have facilitated newer forms of 
cooperation, for example, in cybercrime. The secrecy and shortcomings vis a vis fundamental rights 
of transatlantic cooperation in security generally remain points of concern, similar to all forms of 
transatlantic cooperation as novel and complex integration between legal orders. 
                                                             
62 ͚“uŵŵaƌǇ of CoŶĐlusioŶs of the EU-US JHA Informal Senior Officials Meeting of 25-Ϯϲ JulǇ,͛ CouŶĐil doĐ 
13228/11, p. 3. As to other officials viewpoints with respect the global orientation of EU rule-making, see Cf 
͚CƌitiĐal IŶfoƌŵatioŶ IŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe PƌoteĐtioŶ- Achievements and next steps: towards global cyber-seĐuƌitǇ,͛ 
COM ;ϮϬϭϭͿϭϲϯ fiŶal; ͞PaƌliaŵeŶt deŵaŶds siŶgle EU ǀoiĐe oŶ ĐǇďeƌ-seĐuƌitǇ͟ EUObserver.com, 13 June 2012  
63 See the ratification table at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG> accessed 31 
March 2014. 
